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This paper presents an interpretation on Aristotle’s distinction between natural law and positive 
law. According to this interpretation, the traditionally assumed thesis on Aristotle’s “iusnaturalism” 
should be severely rectified otherwise dismissed. It is not either to be found in Aristotle’s legal 
reflections any variety of “legal positivism”. Departing from a natural law reading of the famous 
passage of Nichomachean Ethics where Aristotle draws the distinction between the two forms of 
political justice, natural justice (physikon dikaion) and legal justice (nomikon dikaion), we cannot 
find conclusive reasons to see therein a conceptual dualism between natural law and positive law as it 
has been traditionally understood. Rather it must be concluded that the true conceptual line is not that 
relating natural and legal justice but the one relating political (politikon dikaion) and legal justice. 
Under this reading, not only legal justice but also the so-called natural justice should be included 
within the Aristotelian concept of positive law in terms of a philosophically grounded universalism in 
the realm of practical reason as opposed to a metaphysical, natural-law view (that is, ultimately a 
theological one). This is indeed corroborated by an analysis of the central role played by the notion of 
praxis, with its epistemological background, in Aristotle's works on ethics and politics, and in 
particular by an analysis of his theory of law. 
 
 
 
 
 In this essay, I shall explore an interpretation on the well-known Aristotle’s definition 
of “legal justice” as it appears in his Nichomachean Ethics in contrast to that of “natural 
justice”. The proposed interpretation claims that such distinction cannot be understood in 
terms of a dualist, dichotomic opposition between “positive law” and “natural law”. It departs 
then from the traditional iusnaturalist reading of that Aristotelian topic as it was received from 
the Thomist-scholastic synthesis, especially in the realm of legal philosophy. Both the 
ontological and moral-theological premises of iusnaturalism are incompatible with the 
practical philosophy of Aristotle and in particular with the legal philosophy that —I will 
defend— underlies the distinction between legal and natural justice.  The iusnaturalist reading 
also contradicts the main assumptions of the Aristotelian epistemology and its foundation of 
“practical reason”, a view that shall be herein emphasized. But it is not only about “rescuing” 
Aristotle out of the main stream of the iusnaturalistic tradition: it also implies a refutation of a 
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“legal positivist” reading of the Aristotelian concept of law. Both interpretations are 
intimately related to each other from a conceptual point of view (besides a historical one) and 
share a number of common assumptions —showing once more the truth of the saying 
contraria sunt circa idem. The Aristotelian reflections on the matter can be said to contain in 
nuce the fundamental concepts of all the subsequent varieties of iusnaturalism and legal 
positivism. Still, they do not tolerate their identification with any of them. 
 In the following pages, which are, as said, a merely exploratory attempt of 
interpretation, my purpose is to point out how the Aristotelian notion of positive law is 
embedded in politics and even in morality, yet without embracing the —allegedly 
insurmountable for western legal philosophy— dualism of the received view between positive 
and natural law. Of course, this is by no means an absolutely new view. There is a number of 
interpreters that have departed from the traditional classical iusnaturalistic vision (scholastic 
or rationalist) rejecting a metaphysical conception of “nature” in favor of a more historicist 
one, turning back again towards practical philosophy.1 Many other interpreters have stressed 
the idea of political justice as a major hermeneutical key for the understanding of Aristotelian 
“natural justice” (Miller, Yack, Burns, Destrée, Bodéüs, Wormuth, Nusbaum…). However, it 
is worth questioning the extent to which the claim on natural justice being morally-politically 
embedded actually means a departure from the received view and its dualism. Besides, there 
are very few commentators (Schroder and Yack among them) that pay special attention to the 
Aristotelian definition of “legal justice”, i.e. to “positive law” instead of to “natural law”, 
which, as noticed, it has been the common approach. To my understanding this is indeed the 
central theme to be analyzed, especially from a legal philosopher’s point of view. The law 
plays a nuclear role in Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as a mediating device between 
morality and politics. Even if his concept of law prefigures that what later will be known as 
iusnaturalism and legal positivism (Conklin 2001: 21ff.), in a retrospective reading —so my 
argument runs— it leads to a superseding of the dichotomy between natural law and positive 
law. At the same time, this allows to highlight some enriching aspects of his theory of law for, 
 
1 Here there must be cited the names of Gadamer, Ritter, Strauss, Voegelin, Weil, Salomon, 
Aubenque, and of course the communitarians. Hegel himself could be placed at the front of this 
tradition when he says that Aristotle "could not have had the concept of a so-called natural law (if this 
is in fact missed) that has to do precisely with the idea of abstract man" which is characteristic of the 
abstraktes Recht of modern state (Hegel 1971 [1833]: 227). 
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once released from iusnaturalism’s metaphysical assumptions, it may be related to important 
issues that are under discussion in the current legal philosophy. 
 * * * 
My comments shall be then on the famous passage right at the beginning of section 7 
Book V from Ethica Nicomachea: 
“[1134b 18] Of political justice part is natural, part legal — natural, that which everywhere has the same 
force and does not exist [20] by people’s thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, 
but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner’s ransom shall be a mina, or that a 
goat and not two sheep be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that 
sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. Now some think that all 
justice [25] is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same 
force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, 
however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; with the gods it is perhaps not true at 
all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is 
by nature, some not by nature. [30] It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being 
otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally 
changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, 
yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of 
convention [1135a] and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere 
equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by 
nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, 
though there is but one which is everywhere and by nature the best [5]”2 
 
I. Legal, natural, political justice. 
 
When one approaches this passage in search for a definition of “law”, the first difficulty 
one runs into is that it is about “justice” (dikaion); thus, a concept that one may initially 
consider to be distant from the former one. The second difficulty encountered is that such a 
definition seems to be inescapably trapped into a sharp dichotomy confronting “natural 
justice” (physikon dikaion) with “legal justice” (nomikon dikaion). We must deal with both of 
them from the very beginning. 
Clearly, the translation of the Greek terms is philosophically-laden in an unavoidable way. 
This makes the text subject not only to philological interpretation but also and specially to 
philosophical interpretation. So, translating to dikaion by “justice” (“what is just”, “the things 
that are just” for the plural ta dikaia) has necessarily the effect of placing us ex initio in an 
 
2 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (trans. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1925), Book V, Ch. 7, 1134b18–1135a5. 
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extra-legal field: i.e. in the moral field or in the ethical, critical morality point of view. This is 
implicitly understood as an ultimate, absolute and more fundamental point of view about law 
(the very notion of “nature” serves as a means for that). If we were to translate instead those 
terms as “things recognized as just” (as Ross does) or as “rules of law” (as Aubenque does 
some times: 1998: 42; 2004: 10) or simply as “law”, either with capital letter 
(“natural/conventional Law”) or with small letter (“natural/conventional right”; even “natural 
rights” [Kraut 1996: 757ff., 773-4] ... or just as “rights” [Miller (1995: 112, passim)]), then 
the idea of justice gets rather circumscribed within the legal-political domain (even solely 
within the legal one). Thus the notion of “political right” (or “political justice”) achieves 
different connotations implying different relationships with morality and law. As it will be 
shown, what is at stake behind these different translations is the very question on how does 
law relate to morals and politics. 
Concerning the second question, the fact that Aristotle considers both legal justice 
(nomikon dikaion) as well as natural justice (physikon dikaion) as distinct kinds or parts of 
political justice (politikon dikaion)3 has been purported to be a sign of the high sophistication 
of the Aristotelian doctrine; certainly of a greater degree than the classical dualist division of 
law or justice according to which Aristotle appears as the true father founder of 
iusnaturalism4 —an ascription that has been widely acknowledged even from a non-
iusnaturalist approach5. In effect, it can be defended that the deep true conceptual line in the 
Aristotelian doctrine is not the one relating natural and legal justice but the one relating 
political justice and legal justice6. As it will be elaborated below, the notion of political 
 
3 It is true though that the ambiguity of the original text favors different interpretations on how 
political justice comes to be subdivided or specified in natural and legal, yet it does not raise any 
doubts at all on the fact that it does so. W. D. Ross speaks of different “parts” whilst other versions 
translate it as “kinds” “forms”, “species”, etc. As Yack points out, both varieties of justice “represent 
two kinds of justice found in the political community rather than higher and lower standards of 
adjudication” (1990: 220). On different translations and possible “vertical” or “horizontal” readings 
see Burns 1998. 
4 As Shellens remarks (1959: 72), “philosophers and historians almost invariably claim that Aristotle 
is the father of natural law”. Similarly, Destrée recognizes him as the “spiritual father” of the natural 
law problem (Destrée 2000: 220) and Trude as “the philosophical founder of authentic natural law” 
(Trude 1955: 177).  
5 See for all Bobbio 1993: 36-7. 
6 See Burns 1998: 144-5. 
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justice is indeed a crucial element to a sound and accurate reconstruction of the Aristotelian 
concept of law. I shall argue that this interpretative key —yet often obscured by other keys in 
many commentators— represents the best critical approach to dismantle any kind of 
iusnaturalistic reading of the Aristotelian text and a
The central question here is whether the Aristotelian concept of law does or does not 
include the notion of “political justice” besides that of “legal justice”. In the case of a positive 
answer to this latter question, the concept of law should somehow include the notion of 
“natural justice” too. Quite the case, since as opposed to precedent thinkers the idiosyncrasy 
of Aristotelian concepts is that the distinction between what is natural and what is legal or 
conventional takes place within the realm of the very political justice (Miller 1995: 75). 
Let us assume that those features attributed by Aristotle to “legal justice” give support to 
the identification of this latter with the notion of “positive law”, either as “legislated law” in 
the sense of a norm (nomos) that has been enacted as a general norm by a legislature 
(nomothetes), or decreed as a particular norm for concrete situations (Aristotle seems to be 
considering both judicial decisions and decrees). Since the idea of a “posited” or positive 
norm is here at stake, we would not incur in any interpretative anachronism at all were we to 
project the notion of ius positivum or iustitia positiva, even if that terminology, as it is known, 
did not appear until many years later, during the early Middle Ages.7 It is also well known 
that the Greek notion of nomos evolves from its initial meaning as custom or pre-legal social 
uses of a diffuse nature to written law as a kind of norm that has been publicly deliberated or 
sanctioned by means of a collective decision; this in its turn may confirm social uses or 
practices of the former kind8. Stated in early Middle Ages’ terms, Aristotelian legal justice is 
therefore ius ab hominibus institutum, that is, “law the sources of which are to be found at any 
rate in human activity” (Opalek 1982: 449), and specially the ius positum as a result of the 
legislature’s activity. In contemporary terms, the law which “is posited, is made law by the 
activities of human beings”; that is to say, by social practices and, specially, by legislative and 
judicial practices.9 
 
7 See Gagner 1960: 210ff.; Kuttner 1936; Ullmann 2008: 62. 
8 See Romilly 2002, passim. On the transition along the 5th century from thesmos (socially accepted 
norm or customary law) to nomos (norm enacted by a political legislature), see Schroeder 2003: 38 ff. 
See also Jones 1956: 102ff. 
9 Raz’s “social thesis” (1979: 37ff.; quotation in p. 38). 
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To define legal justice, Aristotle seems to be using at least six features or criteria closely 
related among each other. In the literature on the issue these defining criteria have been 
traditionally interpreted as distinctive features of positive law against natural law. Most of 
them, still not all, can be drawn on from the above quoted text: 
i) Conventionality. Aristotle speaks using interchangeable terms of that which is just by 
virtue of law and that which is just by virtue of convention (nomikon kai synthekei); He 
speaks of just things “by virtue of convention and expediency” or “by human enactment 
[taxei]” (1135a10). 
ii) The practical nature of positive law. Aristotle links “those things recognized as just 
[dikaia]” —law in its wide sense— to “human affairs” (anthropina), and specifically to the 
acts and decisions of law-makers (or judges and rulers) by means of which legal conventions 
are established. All these acts are a sort of social practice (actually, political), a kind of praxis 
that has to do with “prudence” (phronesis)10; that is, with deliberation (bouleusis) and 
preferential election (prohairesis) as features of human practical rationality. 
iii) The particularistic nature of positive law. Even if it is a compound of rules, and rules 
that can be told somehow general, law is confined to the whole, complex net of acts and 
decisions in which human practice consists of. Yet, those are singular, concrete acts and 
decisions. This turns rules governing them into particularistic practical rules, thus far beyond 
from any sort of absolute universal rules. Were we to speak about the legislature or the judge, 
legal norms —positively established themselves by means of particular practical operations— 
are then always drawn on the practical particular and they point towards the practical 
particular. Their scope of action could never go beyond that practical framework. Accordingly 
law is particular too, namely it is fragmented along different societies (particularly [idios] 
“established by each people in reference to themselves”, Rhetoric, I, 13, 1373b6ff.). 
iv) Contingency. Legal practices belong to “things capable of being otherwise” as long as 
they are subject to “people’s thinking this or that”. Positive legal rules may initially have any 
content whatsoever; it is just the fact of their being stated by convention that makes them such 
rules and gives this or any other content to them. Actions being subject to legal regulation are 
“originally indifferent” and stop being so just “when they have been laid down”. 
 
10 “[T]he law [nomos] has compulsive power, while it is at the same time a rule proceeding from a sort 
of practical wisdom [phroneseos] and reason” (Eth. Nic., X, 9,1180a21-22). 
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v) Indeterminacy. The content of legal rules is exclusively a function of the very course of 
concomitant human practices; accordingly it is a function of those decisions to produce and 
apply them. However, this is an open-textured course: those decisions are not determined by 
any content previous or external to their deliberative and executive production in every 
singular case. In other words: these practices are constitutives of those rules, not the other way 
round. So “when the thing is indefinite [aoristou], also the rule is indefinite” (Eth. Nic., V, 10, 
1137b29-30). 
vi) Variability. Positive law is subjected to change, it is essentially mutable or changeable, 
both historically (from a chronological point of view, i.e. considering here the evolution of a 
certain legal order) and geographically (from a spatial point of view, i.e. considering here 
several legal orders). As long as justice is concerned, “all of it is changeable [kineton]”. 
Above all the others, the first and the last features —conventionality and mutability of 
positive law— are capturing the attention of interpreters. As a consequence, the interpretation 
of the concept of “natural justice” is somehow the outcome of it being projected under the 
light of those other features which, in the Aristotelian text, are standing as the counterpoints 
to the formers, i.e. immutability and necessity. Additionally, the opposition 
universal/particular (third feature) plays a role since this opposition is of a special significance 
in the logic and epistemology (as well as in the ontology) of Aristotle; this is too a crucial 
point in the Thomist interpretation. And thus it is in this apparently unavoidable way that we 
are led to the canonic formulation of the classical dichotomy, forged on the contrast between a 
Positive Law, as mutable, conventional and particular norm, and a Natural Law, as 
immutable, necessary and universal norm. This interpretation places the Aristotelian doctrine 
in a philosophical development drawing on the former distinction between physis-nomos  
introduced by sophists in the 5th century, continued after him by the stoic tradition, later on 
adopted by the theological Middle Ages philosophy, and then eventually secularized by 
modern iusnaturalism. 
However, such a lineal interpretation —from physikon dikaion to natural law— has many 
weak points. It does not take sufficiently into account, or it even neglects, some of the other 
features in the Aristotelian characterization of positive law; specifically, the notion of praxis 
(second feature). Still, this is the fundamental concept giving unity to the whole Aristotelian 
practical philosophy: it is by means of this notion that the connection among law, ethics and 
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politics can be established and it is too the one that allows, particularly, by means of this latter 
connection, to place back in its right place the notion of “political justice” (politikon dikaion). 
Thus, any attempt to an oversimplifying dualistic sort of reading is condemned to failure. I 
shall defend then that an appropriate reading of the Aristotelian notion of “natural justice”, far 
from taking us to that metaphysical concept of “natural law”, should emphasize instead law’s 
practical nature. It will be then shown that criteria of justice (for instance, moral principles) 
are to be considered already incorporated within its framework, operating at its very same 
scale, rather than being external normative contents acting as absolute determinants of 
positive law as iusnaturalism postulates. What Aristotle calls “political justice” is precisely 
the law’s institutional architecture in which moral contents and values, among others, operate. 
Before further elaboration on this, let us see whether and to what extent the iusnaturalist 
interpretation is capable of resisting confrontation with the text itself. 
Attribution to “natural justice” of the features of immutability and necessity is not obvious 
in the Aristotelian passage we are dealing with. It is true that Aristotle starts with a definition 
according to which “natural justice” is that which “has everywhere the same force [dynamin]” 
and that he introduces a clear naturalistic metaphor (the fire “burns both here and in Persia”, 
1134b26) and speaks of the right hand that is “by nature stronger”, 1134b29) as an example of 
the idea that whatever is “by nature is unchangeable” (1134b25). It is also true that from the 
very beginning the idea of natural justice being independent of human opinion is introduced. 
Yet, there is something not to be neglected even in a merely literal reading of the fragment. It 
should be noted that Aristotle is speaking in an indirect style, that is, as it is usual in his 
method, here he is echoing other authors’ opinions and their interpretation of natural and 
legal justice (“some think that…”, “they see…”, 1134b24-27). So, he is making sort of 
transferred assessments, specifically critical transferred assessments, i.e. exactly, assessments 
that he does not agree with. These are basically the following two: 
a) Justice as such is legal or conventional. This is the thesis according to which there is 
not such a thing as a “natural justice” (that would be a sort of contradictio in adiecto). So, 
justice —law— is in its whole essentially variable, particular and contingent. Aristotle seems 
to be attributing this thesis to sophists. He rejects it himself, even if with some precautions 
(“This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense”). And the reason 
for that it is that even if change itself is closely related to a conventional decisional practice 
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that is consubstantial to any sort of positive law (even to any sort of justice), it would also be 
compatible “in a certain sense” with the presence of necessary or permanent elements11. The 
task then consists in the identification of that sense and those elements. The entire denial of its 
presence leads us to relativism and voluntarism: and it might be that “with the gods” (he adds, 
not without a sense of irony)12 will and necessity are all the same but, contrariwise, “with us”, 
there is also a natural justice. So, legal or conventional justice is a necessary but not a 
sufficient criterion for the definition of law. Apparently, this is an argument in favor of the 
iusnaturalist position (there should be objective, universal criteria of justice among men). 
However, this opinion collapses to a great extent once this thesis is connected to the following 
one. 
b) Natural justice is invariable. Aristotle also attributes this thesis to the mentioned 
position; that is, those who believe that all justice is legal and that there is not such a thing as 
a natural justice do so because they take for granted that anything “which is by nature is 
unchangeable and has everywhere the same force” (1134b25-26). And it is strictly in the 
context of that indirect attribution that he introduces the naturalistic reference to fire. Now: 
Aristotle rejects this thesis too as erroneous. He does indeed immediately state that natural 
justice is changeable (and, therefore, any justice is so).13 And the reason for that cannot be but 
the necessary dependency it shows —as a variety of justice— of human decision-making 
practices. So the distinction between conventional and natural elements takes place within 
“things capable of being otherwise”, law and justice here included. Aristotle tells us to be 
“evident” which are the former and the latter ones; still he gives no explicit indication in this 
 
11 As Gauthier-Jolif put it, “all things recognized as just being variable is not incompatible with the 
fact that some of them are based on nature” (1970: II, 394). In a similar sense, Aubenque 1998: 41ff.; 
Miller 1991: 280ff. Of course, the key question is what kind of nature is it assumed and which are its 
epistemological relations with law. 
12 Irony can only be noticed if one takes into account that, in the framework of Aristotelian theology, 
God or the Pure Act has neither communication nor any kind of relation with the human sub-lunar 
world, otherwise its own condition as Pure Act would be degraded. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 7, 
1072b23-30. We will return later to this point. As it has been remarked by Gauthier/Jolif (1970: II 
[vol. 3]), 394, the only purpose of the reference to gods is to emphasize the idea of mutability of 
human matters, justice included. 
13 “[A]ll of it [i.e., justice] is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature” (Eth. Nic., 
1134b29). “[…] assuming that both are equally changeable […]” (1134b29). 
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regard.14 The interpretative keys thus should be drawn from a reconstruction of the premises 
of his philosophical system (where, other ways, the two mentioned critical thesis also must be 
found). But it seems clear for now that Aristotle does not only refute the thesis according to 
which natural justice does not exists (sophists’ relativism) but also he refuses the thesis on the 
existence of an immutable legal justice (this latter criticism is clearly addressed against the 
platonic idealism on the God). Accordingly what has many times been interpreted as a 
contradiction in Aristotle —i.e. he speaking of natural justice as something variable— should 
be rather considered the contradiction of that interpreter who assumes the ungrounded 
supposition according to which A. should profess a certain kind of iusnaturalism based on the 
metaphysical postulate of an immutable, universal natural law.15 
For what has been said so far it should be clear though that the Aristotelian is not a dualist 
theory fragmenting the law into two elements or species, i.e. positive and natural law, as 
iusnaturalism postulates. The distinction between natural and legal justice does not allow 
drawing a contraposition between them both as global totalities one external to the other. The 
text is rather pointing at an internal connection between their constituent elements16, as 
suggested by the fact that they both share certain common properties. Variability does not 
operate as a distinctive criterion, but as a binding element between the conventional and the 
natural dimension of law: both are “equally changeable [kineta homoios]”. We are therefore 
not compelled at all to exceed the realm of law, the realm of “positive right” (Bodéüs 1999: 
71, 80). It rests open however the question on how this should contain elements that are both 
“in a sense” irreducible to conventionality even if variable and not existing “by people’s 
thinking this or that”. All sort of justice (natural too) would have some conventional and 
variable nature, all sort of positive law would have some necessary and permanent nature 
(“everywhere the same force”). This element of necessity and universality clearly distances 
Aristotle from any kind of legal positivism reducing law to its mere nude conventionality —
 
14 Gauthier/Jolif (1970: II, 395) following Joachim, modify the traditional punctuation of the text 
placing the Aristotelian assertion under question mark. On the interpretative difficulties arising from 
this, see Destree 2000: 230-1. 
15 As Destrée (2000: 222ff.) underlines, the variability of natural justice is the “fundamental assertion” 
within the Aristotelian text and this is so in spite of it having been minimized or misunderstood by 
traditional interpretation. See the same opinion in Yack 1990: 218. 
16 See Destrée 2000: 228. 
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and so legal philosophy to a sort of “ideological-positivist” conception17. The Aristotelian 
position, in its criticism of the received distinction physis/nomos, is philosophically much 
more complex and subtle. Against positivism, A. is assuming in fact the relevance of a 
“naturalist” point of view, the claim of which is to contemplate positive law under the light of 
a certain kind of necessity and universality. Now, it is not anyhow an iusnaturalist position. 
Even more, it contains the most powerful refutation of the iusnaturalism as philosophical 
theory of law. 
 
II. Praxis versus Physis: the epistemology of practical reason. 
 
The interpretative hypothesis here adopted is that the “natural” element of law or justice 
cannot be found in the sphere of physis but in that of praxis, namely the framework where 
political and moral realities belong (the framework of polis). In other words, the notion of 
nature mentioned in the texts at stake is a nature already (epistemologically and ontologically) 
interpreted from the perspective of the political and moral practice—it belongs then to the 
practical philosophy. So, the internal connection between legal and natural justice could only 
be drawn on the political nature that they share, being as they are them both constituents of a 
superior and wider totality. The conventional character of legal justice has to do with the set 
of singular practical decisions involved in the processes of enacting and applying legal rules. 
This is a necessary dimension of law, still not the only relevant one: it must also be connected 
to the institutional structure of law as the “invariable” context of its practice, a dimension 
which is precisely characterized by the fact that it establishes internal relations to politics and 
morality. This context represents the “natural” background of legal conventions (somehow 
structural, permanent or universal elements). It does not nevertheless go beyond the domain 
of praxis. 
This hypothesis can be corroborated by means of two argumentative lines which show 
convergent results. On the one side, an ontological line exploring what kind of nature 
underlies the notion of “natural justice”. On the other, an epistemological line exploring what 
 
17 For instance, for Kelsen, Aristotelian natural law “is simply a constituent part” of the “positive law 
of the state”, so the idea of natural justice serves “only for the purposes of the justification of positive 
law” in the sense that a purely ideological political doctrine of a “conservative” character will do 
(Kelsen 1973: 132; 1945: 439ff.; 1960: 376). 
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position does the notion of praxis and practical rationality have in the Aristotelian approach. 
In what follows, I will refer basically to the latter. 
As we have seen above, in Aristotle’s account natural justice includes the property of 
variability. What is the impact of this feature on those attributes from which, presumably, 
immutability resulted? We said those attributes were basically two: necessity and universality. 
How should the thesis on the universality and necessity of natural law —i.e. its having 
“everywhere the same force”— be interpreted if variability is to be predicated of it too? 
The notion of universality in Aristotle’s thought has been often interpreted in a purely 
logical or formal terms, just adopting the extensional perspective of the class-logic as 
developed in the syllogistic of the Prior Analytics. However, this perspective should be 
complemented with the Posterior Analytics’, where Aristotle puts forward his theory of 
science18. It is in this work where the notion of universality appears as being connected to the 
notion of necessity, and the latter in its turn to the notions of causality and truth: that is, 
particularly to the subject matter or content of each very discipline and not merely to its 
logical-formal or discursive structure, which is common to all of them. Precisely one main 
point of Aristotle’s epistemology is that it is problematic to consider logic principles being 
applicable in the same way to different sort of discourses. Science (epistéme), the principal 
exponent of which is geometry, is a theoretical-demonstrative kind of discourse, and 
demonstration (apodeixis) can only be about the necessary (anagkaion), i.e. only when 
supported upon true principles (he alethôn) which manifest the cause (dí aitías). For the value 
of the universal comes out from the very fact that it finds its grounding in the cause (Post. 
Anal., I, 31, 88a5). Genuine universality (katholou) comes from the necessity of the causal 
link, and so in the Posterior Analytics it is purported to be a kind of determinism.19 Given that 
the cause throw us before a necessary (material) truth we can establish the genuine logic or 
 
18 Some interpreters (for instance, Barnes) maintain that Aristotle’ theory of science is prior to his 
theory of the syllogism and thus it determines its structure. See Smith 1982. 
19 “We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to 
knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause 
on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not 
be other than it is. […] Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is 
something which cannot be other than it is” (Post. Anal., I, 2, 71b9ff.). 
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formal universality (kata pantos), i.e. an objective (kath’ hauto) or essential (pan kat’eidos)20 
universality that can be articulated then by the syllogistic mechanism as knowledge of that 
which cannot be otherwise —i.e. is necessarily as it is.21 
So it runs the Aristotelian thesis according to which there is nothing but a universal 
science (Post. Anal., I, 30ff.). This is a critical epistemological thesis as a result of which all 
other discourses on particular, contingent or changeable matters, that is, those that “can be 
otherwise” are put under question. In these kinds of discourse it is not possible to speak about 
necessity, therefore nor can we speak of genuine universality, even if logic principles are 
applicable. And this is so since its material scopes are not susceptible of objective 
universalization, and hence neither of a genuine causal-universal knowledge of a determinist 
nature22. This latter being a distinctive feature of demonstrative sciences, the only that could 
be appropriately called “theoretical sciences” —constituting a contemplative, purely 
intellectual or disinterested kind of knowledge (natural sciences, mathematics, etc.). 
Now, precisely, that particular and contingent material fields are the realm of “human 
affairs” (anthropeia), i.e., there where the existence of things depends on human action 
(praxis) and thus always revolves around its own execution and own products.23 Moral, legal 
and political realities are therefore here concerned. The principles governing them cannot 
actually be universal for they are ex post actione principles.24 Consequently, they are to that 
extent affected by the contingency, variability and particularism of human actions themselves. 
We do not find in here a true universal knowledge but equally particular and contingent kinds 
of knowledge, given at the very same scale than action itself (for instance, rhetoric and 
dialectics, ethical and political prudence, the whole variety of techniques…) and of a 
probable, doxastic and accidental nature.  
 
20 That is, opposed to (for instance, in the inductive syllogism) to a merely enumerative or statistic 
universality (pan kat’arithmon). See Post. Anal., I, 5, 74a31. 
21 Post. Anal., I, 4, 73b26. 
22 “Therefore no attribute can be demonstrated or known by strictly scientific knowledge to inhere in 
perishable things” (Post. Anal., I, 8, 75b24). 
23 “In the things capable of being otherwise are included both things made and things done”, and 
specifically the realm of phronesis (Eth. Nic., VI, 4, 1140a1; 5). On actions as causes of different 
moral ways of being, see X, 9, 1181b15; II, 2, 1103b30. 
24 Metaph., VI, 1, 1025b20ff.; Eth. Nic., VI, 5, 1140b15. 
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However, Aristotle assumes at the same time that ethics and politics have to be interpreted 
in terms of the rational grounding entailed by the logos that internally inspires them25. Thus 
the emerging of the notion of “practical reason”: reason that gives support to ethical and 
political action, which is always logos-accompanied action (kata logon prattein); and of the 
idea of “practical science” (episteme praktike) too. This makes evident Aristotle’s attempt to 
rationalize the praxis by means of an analogical extension to it of the structure of the logic of 
scientific-demonstrative rationality. But practical reasoning (syllogismos ton prakton) as 
opposed to scientific is interwoven in the (moral, political) practice itself where it emerges, 
and lacks of ontological grounding beyond the sphere of action of individuals. That is, it lacks 
of an objective grounding in a naturalist strict sense. This practical immanency of theory is in 
contrast with scientific theories, which are independent of any practical or technical 
application —they contain “contemplative” truths, non-dependent on any deliberation at all26. 
Thus, practical reasoning involves action when it comes the time to obtain, deliberate, 
balance and choose those principles or reasons (norms and goals) which appear to be relevant 
under the particular circumstances where it is performed. Practical principles are deliberative 
as long as they must be specified for each particular situation by means of alternatives of 
action. Due to their material content they only come into existence in individuals as the point 
of imputation of the action and rests on its very performance.27 Not only the major and minor 
premises but also the conclusion involves the agent’s practical decision: practical syllogism is 
 
25 For instance, right at the beginning of Eth. Nic., after maintaining that the “just actions [ta dikaia], 
which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they 
may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature” (I, 3, 1094b14ff.), he refutes this idea 
as being in fact merely an appearance: only those opinions and theories having a “rational founding 
[echein tina logon]” must be taken into consideration (1095a30). 
26 Cf. Metaph., I, I, 981a5-981b10; VI, I, 1026a10ff.; XI, 7, 1064b2-3; Post. Anal., 100a5ff.; Eth. Nic., 
III, 3, 1112a20-1112b30. 
27 “We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done […] every class of men 
deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts”; “By ‘possible’ things I mean things 
that might be brought about by our own efforts”; “It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a 
moving principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself” 
(Eth. Nic., III, 3, 1112a18ff.). Human teleology in terms of means/ends is shaped then at a practical 
objects’ scale, which is the scale of possible actions the deliberation and performance of which 
involves the agent so far as their meaning derives from the particular situation or the series of 
particular practical situations conforming human life (see Rhonheimer 1994: 236ff.; Wieland 1990). 
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onsidered to be located in a different plane to that 
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(praxis)28. Practical reason is not merely about reasoning but also and above all about acting. 
And thus radical plurality comes into place (“the good is said in many different ways”) and so 
it does not only its singularity (itself always being referred to particular individuals and 
situations), but also its contingency and fallibility in the transition from principles to 
conclusions (akrasia). There could not exist universal ethical norms to achieve the good life, 
but at most models of wise (phronimos) or virtuous man (spoudaios), which is the unique 
“standard and measure” (kanon kai metron).29 Eventually, the initial analogy turns to 
highlight the radical epistemological incommensurability between the two forms of 
rationality, theoretical and practical, between episteme and phronesis30. 
The consequences of this epistemologica
aturalistic claim. This can be characterized by the postulate of the existence of certain 
“natural” contents or groundings that, on the one side —in their universality— are beyond the 
purely particular realm of both human conventions or practices (such as legislators’ will) and, 
on the other, are absolutely determinative of such a conventional practice. Both features 
(independence from human voluntarist decisions and deterministic or necessary contents for 
positive law —both of them criteria for its critical evaluation in terms of justice— would be 
the features par excellence of natural law. Now, which are those universal and necessary 
contents that are predicated from the perspective of iusnaturalism of Aristotelian “natural 
justice”? They could only be of two kinds: 
α) Contents of a theoretical discourse, c
ere any sort of practice evolves (and therefore the practice of legal justice or positive law 
too). We would speak then of the relation of determination that natural factors exert upon it, 
either shaping the basic “infrastructure” of praxis or standing above it (in a supernatural 
plane). 
 
28 Cf. Eth. Nic., VII, 3, 1147a26ff.; De motu animalium, 7, 701a4-33; De anima, 434a16ff. See 
Anscombe 1957: 60; 1977: 68ff.; Michelakis 1961: 63ff.; Nussbaum 1985: 183ff.; Oriol 2004: 16ff. 
29 Eth. Nic., III, 4, 1113a34 [189]. See Aubenque 1963: 51 (sp. ed.). 
30 “Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of 
things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it 
is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be scientific 
knowledge nor art” (Eth. Nic., VI, 5, 1140a32-1140b1; cf. 1142a23-25). See Granger 1976: 317, 336; 
Shiner 1994: 1257ff.; Reeve 1992: 73ff. 
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β) Contents of a practical discourse, considered to be at the same plane than practice 
(mores, ethical criteria, systems of values, critical morality, political determinants, etc.). 
Both possibilities give account of the basic forms of iusnaturalism that took place along 
history after Aristotle. We could refer to them, following certain academic use, as the 
“ontological” and “deontological” varieties of iusnaturalism31 (even if merely for denotative 
purposes since this distinction lacks of sound grounding as we will see below). The important 
point for our purposes is that both ways of giving account of the concept of a “natural law” 
are incompatible with the Aristotelian assumptions. The first because the naturalist contents at 
stake are not really a law; the second because they are not really natural. Let us briefly 
elaborate on these two points: 
A) There can be neither a “justice” nor a “Law” as part of “nature”. This is so as far as the 
praxis cannot be —qua tale— the subject of a theoretical discourse. Of course, laws or 
nomological-universal, naturalistic structures do exist and affect human praxis (for instance, 
those of the kind we currently call ethological or socio-biological), but such structures are not 
by themselves necessary determinants of human praxis, since it evolves in a different 
autonomous level which is epistemologically irreducible to them. Even if there were to exist 
objective-causal grounds involved in action, and even if they could be themselves analyzed 
from a theoretical-scientific point of view, we could not obtain in that way any norm at all —
that is, any principle for moral or political action. These can only be deliberately articulated 
and chosen by means of the practical agent’s operations. On the contrary, in theoretical 
discourse there is no place to deliberation at all.32 And when that deliberation incorporates 
those nomological grounds, then these would not be determinist and necessary anymore 
because they will need to be translated into particular courses of conduct adapted to the 
practical agent’s own teleology (i.e., practical rules or norms) and thus susceptible to “be 
otherwise” —that is, they will be changeable and contingent. Norms cannot be thus natural, 
and if they were natural then they could not be norms.33 The gap between theoretical and 
 
31 Cf., for example, Weinreb 1987. 
32 “Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or the 
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square” (Eth. Nic., III, 3, 1112a21ff.; cf. VI, 5, 
1140a32). 
33 Just after having related ethics to custom at the beginning of Book II Aristotle says: “From this it is 
also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can 
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practical reason acknowledged in Aristotle’s epistemology provides us with the first and most 
powerful impugnation of the “naturalistic fallacy”. Norms cannot be deduced or obtained 
from nature since they must be established by human decision (prohairesis). It is not possible 
to locate in “nature”, as if they were objective contents, those which are indeed rules (or any 
other practical contents of the law such as values or principles), and which only ex post, by 
means of conventional, positive choices and decisions of the legislator, can be turned into law. 
B) Here the point is about determination of some norms (those norms of the positive law) 
by means of other norms. The same “category mistake” is made however since certain 
instances are introduced as if they were “natural” when they are actually norms, and then not 
contents of physis at all (but contents of praxis). Hence, the ambiguity of the underlying 
concept of nature, itself presented with justificatory purposes as if it were an objective 
instance of determination. This intends to conceal from us an elemental fact: that such a claim 
fails as long as the relation between practical norms can only be in its turn practical and then 
contingent or indeterminate. In other words, the relation between for instance morality and 
positive law is not an objective —theoretical— relation between normative contents but a 
relation based upon the practical deliberation of the corresponding legal authority to decide 
whether those presupposed “natural” contents are or not to be translated into law and in which 
manner. It presupposes then a practical reasoning: the presence of universal and necessary 
(“natural”) contents in the praxis cannot adopt anymore the form of a theoretical-scientific 
form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be 
habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor 
can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be 
trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; 
rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit” (Eth. Nic., II, 1, 
1103a25ff.). Then, there is a natural determination over those capacities on which acquisition and 
improvement of virtue operate, but they belong per se to a different level, that of praxis, and not to 
nature itself. In this latter it will lack of any sense to speak of “customs” or “habits” since they are 
exclusively anthropocentric (deliberative, practical) concepts, that is, moral-political. Aristotle’s 
reference to “natural virtue” in Eth. Nic., VI, 13, 1144b4-9 is yet a reference to behaviour dispositions 
those considered as assumed basis for praxis (virtue “in the strict sense” is only the one “which 
involves practical wisdom”). The same is found in Pol., VII, 13, 1332a38ff.: men become good thanks 
to three factors (nature, habit and reason), but since only men are guided by reason virtue consists 
precisely in departing from nature. Thus there is no place for a “natural” justice as a sort of an ethical 
or political virtue. To acknowledge this fact impulses us to the second of the two alternatives we refer 
to in the text. This second alternative takes praxis as a sort of “second nature” under the assumption 
that man has not actually “nature” but “history” (see e.g. Voegelin 2002: 150). It is also then the 
starting point for the historicists and deontological readings of Aristotelian natural law. 
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discourse. From an epistemological point of view, the question about the existence of 
theoretical necessity (and hence universality) in positive law (legal justice) must be 
negatively answered. 
The foregoing reasons make it implausible to maintain that underlying Aristotle’s natural 
justice there is a postulate of a ius naturale in the sense of “an ideal law which can be known 
and appraised with an even greater measure of certainty than all existing legislation”, to 
express it in D’Entrèves’ words (2004: 93), or in any other sense one shall give to it. It is not 
adequate to translate physikon dikaion as “natural law” neither under a naturalist meaning (the 
first type we distinguished) nor under a moral one (the second type). All these are not only 
retrospective but also anachronistic interpretations of the Aristotelian text, i.e. interpretations 
which are philosophically inconsistent with the epistemological assumptions of his system. 
They both are indeed strongly connected to each other, since somehow they find their 
common origin in the reading that Thomas Aquinas made of the Aristotelian text, from which 
stem in its turn the dualist interpretation we are trying to escape from.34 
 
34 “Political justice [iustum politicum] is rightly divided in these two parts [i.e., iustum naturale and 
iustum legale). For citizens practice justice because nature put it into human mind and because it is 
enacted [positum] by law”, and “nature —the cause of the iustum naturale— is the same everywhere 
[ubique] among men”. Therefore, “the iustum naturale does not consist in what seems or does not 
seem to be [videri vel non videri], that is, it does not arise from some human opinion but from nature”. 
So, “the reasons for changeable things [mutabilium] are of an unchangeable kind”, and “the legal or 
positive justice [iustum legale sive positivum] has always its origin in natural justice [iustum 
naturale]” (Th. Aquinas, In decem libros Ethicorum, V, 12, nn. 1017, 1018, 1023, 1029 [my transl.]). 
As it was later developed in the Summa, natural law bases its universality and immutability on a 
projection to the practical field of the Aristotelian doctrine of the first principles of the theoretical field 
(ibid., n. 1018; Rhonheimer 1994: 535ff.). Natural law is human practical reason as long as it reflects 
certain universal and self-evident first principles showing the created world order and indicating, 
through synderesis, what man ought to do. As for its general principles, it is the same for all the men, 
and it does not change. However in its human application those latter generate secondary principles or 
conclusions that may be exposed to error and fallibility (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 91, a.2, a.3; q. 94, 
a.4, a.5). Thus natural law turns out to be qualified in the particular circumstances in which it is 
applied in human practice, and so may change, being at the same time in itself natural (i.e., universal 
and immutable). Now, this is essentially the same interpretation underlying most contemporary 
rehabilitations of a iusnaturalist reading of Aristotle in so far as they, once allegedly having let aside a 
universalist, metaphysical concept of nature, resort to a particular concept of natural justice (a “human 
nature”, a “nature of things” or Natur der Sache, often understood in historicist terms). This particular 
nature is still an application or manifestation of the former in human practice or history, and that is 
why it is called “natural” in spite of its variability. See e.g. Gadamer 2007: 390ff., 614; Strauss 1953: 
159ff.; Ritter 1961: 15ff., 24ff.; Voegelin 2002: 140ff.; Sigmund 1971: 12, 39; Miller 1996: 893; 
Aubenque 1980: 154; etc. 
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The epistemological irreducibility of praxis to physis has substantial ontological 
consequences. The most important of those is that the iusnaturalistic interpretations which are 
based upon the cosmologic teleologism of Aristotle’s general ontology35 are also groundless. 
The cosmological idea of Nature (universe as complexio omnium sustantiarum), even if it 
answers to the hierarchical-teleological structure in which each being constitutes its own 
perfection as actualization of a potency by means of the action of the efficient and final causes 
(under the limit-idea of Pure Act) is nevertheless not a practical teleology. For this to be the 
case (as it will happen under the Christian worldview) it is required the idea of a God as a 
universal creator-legislator, a dator formarum, and with it that of a deontological universe. 
Still, even if Aristotle is the author of the idea of a metaphysic God, the Pure Act, and in this 
sense one can affirm that “his original metaphysics was theology” (Jaeger 1948: 216), it is 
neither the architect of the world nor it has any contact with it at all36. Consequently, 
Aristotle believes it to be ridiculous the idea of a “divine justice” 37. In the Aristotelian 
metaphysics, praxis constitutes only a chapter of his physis (this understood in an ontological-
general sense), not its invasion. As it has been argued by Aubenque, it is the bastion of 
contingency and human freedom in a necessitarist world. In conclusion, in the Aristotelian 
metaphysics praxis constitutes only a chapter of physis (this understood in an ontological-
general sense), not its absolute invasion. This latter would have implied its theological 
anthropomorphization as it was later postulated by the thomist moral onto-theology based 
upon an eternal law and a divine providence from which human reason is presumed to find 
“natural ethical principles” inherently given in the order of the real (Schroeder 2003: 44-5). 
As it has been argued by Aubenque, Aristotle’s praxis is rather the bastion of contingency and 
human (“too human”) freedom in a necessitarist world. The “ontology of ethics” (to use 
 
35 Cf. Metaph., V, 4, 1015a35ff., where the ousia or eidos of things that exist “by nature” is identified 
with their telos. 
36 In Aubenque words: “Aristotle’s God does not create. He lets it be” (Aubenque 1962: 372 [sp. 
transl.]). Kelsen, for instance, interprets along these lines the Aristotelian metaphysics, thus 
considering it an ideology of inactivity and political resignation (1979: 156ff., 191). 
37 Cf. Eth. Nic., X, 8,1178b10ff. Compared to his predecessors, Aristotle’s philosophy operates a 
desacralization of the concept of law (Aubenque 1980: 150), as a result of his criticism of the different 
“normative” uses of the concept of nature (with its theological background) running from the times of 
the sophists, not to mention poets’ and dramatists’ uses of the same term. This tradition had ended up 
by stuffing that concept with ambiguity and ambivalence: nature could be good or bad, divine or 
bestial, rational or blind (see Romilly 2002: Ch. VIII). 
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Voegelin’s expression, from which he draws a conclusion opposite to ours; cf. 2002: 148ff.) 
cannot embrace the Scala naturae so far as the former appears to be organized in virtue of 
contents (such as eudaimonia or justice) that are essentially linked to the ethical and political 
praktikon thus leading us to a totally different, split-off meaning of “nature”38. This represents 
an insurmountable obstacle to any interpretation inclined to speak either of a law in nature or 
a natural right or to identify therein “pract
 
III. Law as praxis. 
 
This is corroborated by the Aristotelian political philosophy and precisely by virtue of the 
role played in it by law. In effect, the constitution —embodiment of political justice— is for 
Aristotle the formal and final cause of the polis (cf. Miller 1995: 79). It is not however a 
natural cause (physis) but a practical one resulting out of the activity of human legislator who 
takes aim at a practical purpose (a normative organization of the polis which is oriented to the 
common good). Justice is “the order of the political community [politikes koinonias taxis]” 
(Pol., I, 2, 1253a24; cf. IV, 1, 1289a15ss.). It is about a consciously deliberated order (taxis) 
which entails coordination of human actions by means of practical reason; it is not about a 
kosmos or natural order determined by objective and necessary regularities  (see Miller 1995: 
28, 45, 336ff.; Yack 1993: 88ff.). The practical sphere, comprising ethics-morality-politics, is 
then the appropriate framework for the notion of justice to be placed (instead of any 
naturalistic notion of “nature”). 
And this is how, turning back to our initial text, Aristotle locates the practice of positive 
law right at the middle of the scenario and with it, legislators’ and judges’ decisions which are 
the means by which legal conventions are established in the political community. This is 
presented as a constitutive practice, a practice that creates its own scale of signification, its 
own autonomous “code” in terms of norms and values. This is the general sense we should 
 
38 Aubenque 1963: 17, 165 (sp. ed.). The ontology of phronesis is an “ontology of contingency” (ibid., 
79). On the relation of this to the indeterminacy of future events, see ibid. 108, 123ff. The ontological 
difference between the telos in the metaphysical sense —that to which all being tend “by nature”— 
and the telos in the practical sense —human deliberative agent being here involved— should then not 
be surprised. More the same as for the notion of universality that in general A. identifies with nature 
(that what exists “either always or for the most part”, Physic, II, 8, 199b23-24; Met., VI, 2, 1027a10). 
This universality is substantially different indeed whenever it may or may not include human actions. 
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give to the clause Aristotle uses to define legal justice: “that which is originally indifferent 
[diapherei], but when it has been laid down [thontai] is not indifferent”. That original 
indifference means, overall , that human practice is under-determined by any naturalist factors 
at all: these allow many different deliberations without determining by themselves one 
particular norm better than any other —it is only the prohairesis of the practical individual in 
making those decisions what insufflates norms and values to the natural world. Thus, this is 
how it should be interpreted the critical meaning of that reference to the fire which “burns 
both here and in Persia”: those who were to believe that natural justice has this kind of 
necessity and universality over positive law make an epistemological mistake (they 
erroneously take practical reason as if it was theoretical reason) and a ontological one (the 
metaphysical hypostasis of norms as natural entities). As it is also critical the other 
Aristotelian reference of a naturalist content: “by nature the right hand is stronger”, but this 
does not make it be neither good nor bad; further this can be modified by virtue of social 
norms, thus through education “it is possible that all men come to be ambidextrous”. “Men do 
many things against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades them that they ought” 
(Pol., VII, 13, 1332b6-8). Nature only stops being indifferent then just whenever, and due to 
the fact that, those norms are laid down. 
Much the same can be said, on the other hand, for those moral contents in a pre-legal 
sense (positive morality) or for moral standards of justice (critical morality or ethics). Here it 
is at stake the normative justification of legislative conventions and, in general, critical 
evaluation of positive law. Is legal justice —convention as established by the positive 
legislator— the only relevant and ultimate criterion of justice? Does Aristotle —as Hobbes 
later on did— maintain that auctoritas, non veritas facit legem? In order to give an 
appropriate answer to this, it shall be enough to take into consideration that the idea of 
convention and the idea of authority lying underneath Aristotelian positive law is an entirely 
rationalist idea. It resorts to the legislator’s “decision” and “will” but it is neither decisionistic 
nor voluntaristic; it resorts to the “form” of positive law, but it is not formalist. And it is not 
so because positive law is that institutionalization of practical rationality that connects 
morality and politics to each other: that is the meaning of its being a part of “political justice”. 
It is in this —into the unity of practical reasoning— where those contents of “natural justice” 
are to be found. 
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Aristotle draws a clear picture of the institutional structure of legal practice and its 
rationality, globally as well as in its constituent elements (legislative and judicial practices). 
As a whole, law is a second-order institution that somehow totalizes first-order social 
practices and this is always a political, “architectonical” enterprise: for laws are “the ‘works’ 
of the political art”, and “in their enactments on all subjects [peri hapanton]” they affect all 
men and aim at “common interest of all” and self-sufficiency (autarkeia), “so that in one 
sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components 
for the political society“39. Law selectively intervenes upon customs and positive moral 
norms. As a result of this intervention, certain guidelines are universalized for all the 
individuals as citizens. Thus the importance of the law: as a practical device which is 
necessary for the construction of a state taking the way from ethics to politics40. It is the 
legislator who in a single act and after long deliberation introduces a normative, prospective 
universal that aims at making “the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the 
wish of every legislator”41. For sure, the notion of deliberation involves a practical reasoning 
by the legislator, whereas the notion of habit implies that this universal is a practical rule 
bound to  be accomplished in the future by citizens, or enforced upon them by the judge as an 
“intermediate” or “mediator” between the legislator and the citizens42. 
And this is the reason why the text here commented attributes to the legislative practice a 
constitutive character, thus making a qualitative difference. Law cannot be deduced either 
from the social practice’s precedent state or from the preexistent norms operating in it. It can 
only be deduced from the very fact of it having been established, “posited” by the legislator 
with this or that other content, and so from the practical effects that it will entail for the future 
too. Here we come across the starting-point of all later theories of legal positivity (Kein 
Imperativ ohne Imperator), which necessarily refer to the practical character of law as an 
 
39 Eth. Nic., VI, 8, 1141b25; X, 9, 1181b1; V, 1, 1129b15ff. 
40 See Chap. 9 of Book X of the Eth. Nic. On law as a kind of mechanism for the modification and 
reform of moral and customary rules by political authority, see Schroeder 2003: 20-1. 
41 Eth. Nic., II, 1, 1103b1ff. “Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; 
for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal” (V, 7, 1135a6ff.). 
“[L]aws are made after long consideration […] the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but 
prospective and general” (Rhet., I, 1, 1354b1ff.). 
42 Eth. Nic., V, 4, 1132a20ff. 
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institution, to put it in Austin words, only “existing by position”43. Consequently: being 
previously indifferent (diapherei), once it is established it is not indifferent anymore.44 
It is not however a matter of moral indifference. This is the usual interpretation, and the 
traditional, iusnaturalist one too45. According to it, law lacks of substantive validity unless it 
specifies by means of its particular positive rules moral norms (i.e. “natural justice”). So, law 
is a part of morality (a “special case” of moral discourse, in terms of Alexy). On the contrary, 
legal positivism defends that law and morality must remain separated not only from the 
perspective of the identification of law but from the perspective of its justification too. Now, 
Aristotle’s theory proves to be irreducible to any of these two theses. 
As we have seen, legal rules considered as posited rules are for Aristotle just only “in a 
sense” (1129b11). Aristotle rejects a purely positivistic view of legal practice and its 
characteristic “separation thesis”: justice not only concerns to legal form —authority— but to 
its contents too, and not any content whatsoever makes law just. Legal rules do have an 
internal connection to moral contents. Now, this is not more scholastico either. It is rather 
derived from the fact of law constituting a form of political justice. Positive law —legal 
justice— does not relate to morality as if they both were disjunctive spheres, external to each 
other. That is, in terms of static, logical relations between general and particular, genus and 
species, form and matter: viz. theoretical relations. Rather their relation is a dynamic, 
practical or historical one, thus given in the transition from moral norms to a re-organization 
of the standards of justice at a new level: that of a political community. 
Laws are general rules not just in the logic sense of the term but also in the sense of being 
generally followed and enforced in social practices. Only through laws and through the 
 
43 Austin 1970 [1861]: 2. In the same sense Kelsen 1960: 201: “The norms of a legal order must be 
produced by a particular act of imposition [Setzungsakt]. They are enacted norms, i.e., positive norms, 
elements of a positive order”. 
44 Closely related to this it is too Raz’s practical difference thesis, that is, the thesis about the practical 
difference that the legislator as a normative authority introduces when it gives a solution to 
coordination problems by way of establishing new conventions or incorporates previous conventions. 
The decision that was taken by the legislator purports a change in that what those subjected to its 
authority must do, and it does so by means of taking sides for one of the previously equally acceptable 
multiple options that could be adopted: those are indifferent until the very moment when the authority 
pronounces itself (Raz 1986: 30ff., 60). 
45 Cf. Leyden 1967: 3; Barker 1959: 321ff.; Miller 1995: 75; Burns 1998: 146, 154; Yack 1990: 219, 
220. 
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relations of freedom and equality they impose in society is political justice possible (Eth. Nic., 
V, 6, 1134a28ff.). This is justice “according to law and between people naturally subject to 
law” (1134b13ff.). The “naturalness” of this kind of justice is then essentially related to the 
structural conditions of the constitution of a political society or politeia46. Political justice is 
institutionalized justice, that is, administration of justice (dike) exclusively attached to law 
(nomos) and consisting of decisions or judgments (krisis) on what is just (to dikaion) that are 
obligatory in the sense of being backed by coercion47. The realm of the justice is the realm of 
that which is “legal and equal [to nomimon kai to ison]” (V, 1, 1129a34), and both are 
contextual and relative to positive law as a practice: that practice connected to the institutions 
of legality or “rule of law” within the frame of the polis. In this institutions “we do not allow a 
man to rule, but rational principle” (Eth. Nic., V, 6, 1134a35.). So equality (to ison) —which 
is justice’s essential content— reveals itself as a truly political concept the universal 
dimension of which derives from an analysis of the structure of positive legal orders to the 
extent to which they are based on the “rule of law”: “for where the laws do not govern there is 
no constitution [politeia]” (Pol., IV, 4, 1292a32). And a rule-based system of legal justice 
reveals itself to be a sort of “political constant”, since all regimes adhere to some sort of 
justice (III, 9, 1280a9). 
However, the authority of legal justice is neither based upon a merely formal-procedural 
(Fuller 1969: 33ff., 153ff.) nor content-independent (Kelsen 1960: 201ff.) kind of rationality. 
Its consisting of institutional, authoritative decisions supported by official coercion does not 
nevertheless isolate law from moral discourse. To the opposite, they are strongly connected to 
substantive moral reasons: “For practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are 
those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole [hole arete]; for 
the law bids us practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice. And the things that 
tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have 
been prescribed with a view to education for the common good” (V, 2, 1130b18ff.). From a 
justificatory (not only a genetic) perspective, and against formalism, the legal institution is not 
self-referred. As a political institution, it does tend not only to achieve the end of common 
 
46 Cf. Nussbaum (1985: 212). It is about “reasons for rules” themselves: reasons justifying the political 
authority and its “asymmetry” (e.g., the promotion of equality, fairness, stability, efficiency, allocation 
of power, etc.). See Schauer 1991: 135ff. 
47 Pol., I, 2, 1253a32-33. Miller 1995: 58-9. 
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coexistence but also that of the good life or “life according to virtue [bion ton kat’ areten]” 
(Pol., III, 9, 1281a6; III, 13, 1284a2; IV, 2, 1289a30ff.; VII, 1, 1323a14ff.). 
Legal rules have normative groundings beyond legal practice. They indeed refer to moral 
conventions which are not created but rather presupposed by them as something given. Still, 
those moral grounds are normatively relevant to law only when incorporated by law, viz., 
codified and formalized in terms of general positive legal rules within the political frame. 
This means that moral reasons are not valid proprio vigore as an allegedly “natural”, 
objective order but only as being part of the practical reasoning of legislators and judges. So 
the law is neither a mere “specification” or “particular case” of morality, nor is its relation to 
this latter merely “declarative” as argued by traditional (deontological) iusnaturalism. 
Moreover, given that positive law is the only institution through which moral norms and 
values can be universalized in the public, political sphere, being then applicable to all 
citizens, it turns out that morality itself is the one to be in need of the law48. 
It is clear then that it lacks of any plausibility to hold that such moral contents belong to a 
universal “natural justice” placed beyond the framework of political justice. The interpretation 
that Thomist iusnaturalism advocated for as well as that of other conceptions seeking since 
Kant to derive the contents of justice for positive law from a universalist ideal-critical 
morality are flawed. From an Aristotelian approach (rather close to the Hegelian Sittlichkeit) a 
plain metaphysical hypostasis of moral norms underlies those interpretations. These norms are 
neither “previous” nor “external” to positive law; they are instead always incorporated to it 
insomuch as internally tied to the complexity of the very practice of legal institutions49. It is 
not required to cross the limits of political justice in order to ground and critically evaluate 
positive law in terms of justice. The best evidence for this is provided by the very important 
notion of epieikeia or equity, by means of which values underlying legislative rules come into 
 
48 As Miller (1995: 59) puts it: “[L]egal judgement is indispensable for the habituation and moral 
development of the citizens. Hence, human beings require a legal and political system in order to 
acquire ethical virtue”. That is the reason why the universal, unqualified sense of justice (haplos 
dikaion) is closely tied to “virtue taken as a whole [hole arete]” (Eth. N., 1130a10), for it presupposes 
the legal institution as the promoting device of all the ethical virtues now in the political sphere. 
49 As Burns (1998: 155) puts it: “They exist immanently within the principles of political justice of a 
particular polis”. 
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play in adjudication so that to rectify the scope of such rules50. So the existence of a critical 
morality based on justificatory principles, ideals or values upon which legislative rules rest is 
itself, still only partially, a result of law as a political institution. 
Consequently, resorting to an ideal-universal system of moral principles as an absolute 
ground for positive law has been always under one risk: that the alleged superfluousness51 of 
positive law may turn against, especially if it is the case that the very contents of justice of 
such principles precisely demand the institutionalization of a system of decisions politically 
organized (i.e. a system of legal justice) so that to resolve those practical problems that moral 
discourse is not able to resolve on its own52. For example: the problem about how much it 
should be paid for a prisoner’s ransom or about what should be offered as a sacrifice to the 
gods. This sort of problems cannot be solved only by deliberative regressus to the generic 
relevant principles: whether all prisoners should be ransomed and the gods honored (which 
are not only moral principles, but also political). The progressus or establishment of a 
practical rule that sets a particular course of action rather than other (the price of a mina, the 
sacrifice of a goat or two sheep) is required. Since principles can be mutually articulated in 
many different ways, many rules and particular decisions might be indifferently obtained from 
them alone. The relationship between the principles of morality and the legal rules cannot 
 
50 Cf. Eth. Nic., V, 10, 1137b10-41; Rhet., I, 13, 1374a25ff.; V, 1354b7. The epieikeia is a 
characteristic feature of positive-legal adjudication as far as it deals with decision on particular cases 
brought before the courts. Since legislative rules are referred to general types of actions, then when “a 
case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement” (Eth. Nic., 1137b20; Rhet., 1374a30) 
it is necessary for the judge to adapt and rectify the rule at stake. Aristotle establishes here the basic 
theses of the legal method of interpretation (Rhet., 1374b10-15). Specially and above all he establishes 
the fundamental thesis on the defeasibility of rules in those cases of over- and under-inclusiveness 
according to the principles and rationales that underlie these rules (for “the legislator himself would 
have so done”). The epieikeia reveals two structural properties of the law: the indeterminacy of its 
rules and the incorporation of moral criteria when attempting to reduce it in each particular case. As 
Aristotle remarks, equity is “better than one kind of justice —not better than absolute justice but better 
than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement”. Though having been traditionally 
understood as a referral instance to “natural justice” or “natural law” (cf. Th. Aquinas, In dec. Eth., V, 
16, n. 1081; Gauthier/Jolif 1970: II, 432ff.; Trude 1955: 124ff.; Gadamer 2007: 391), equity can only 
take place within the framework of a system of legality (Ferrajoli 2000: 156, 162; Yack 1990: 227-8; 
Shiner 1994: 1250). Yet if it operates resorting to a justificatory connection to principles and moral 
values that are placed beyond that system and towards which the legal practice refers.  
51 See Nino 1994: 130ff. 
52 Cf. Alexy 1989: 212ff., 292ff.; Finnis 1980: 281ff. 
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thus be a mere derivation from the general to the particular. It is, once more, rather a 
constitutive determination in which the authority introduces a before-and-after point.53 
And precisely here lays the source of variability and contingency of legal orders, since 
moral conceptions vary and so it does political good, for this “is said in many different ways”. 
Different goals might be assigned to the polis by the constitution —there is no an indefectible 
“natural good” determining political praxis— and again those goals might be compounded 
and articulated into law in many different ways. We get here to the famous final clause of our 
text: “the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment [anthropina dikaia] 
[i.e. positive legal orders] are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the 
same, though there is but one which is everywhere [pantakhou] and by nature [kata physin] 
the best [ariste]” (1135a3-5). Once more the philosophical-critical methodology underlying 
this assertion presupposes that the perfect constitution cannot be conceived as a supra-
historical ideal model to be placed beyond the practical variable domain of the positive, 
actually existent legal orders.54 It is a regulative ideal immanent to the historical-practical 
process of development and transformation of legal orders, instead of interpretations of 
neither a timeless human nature nor a universal ideal justice only satisfied “as far as actual 
circumstances permit” (Miller 1995: 377). The concrete institutions belonging to each of 
those legal orders are the only critical kanon kai metron for the rationalization, reform or 
improvement of any other given legal order and thus providing a model that can be postulated 
as the best “in its kind” or “by nature”. Even Aristotle says that more than one constitution 
 
53 The semantic vacuity or tautological character of the principles of natural law is a problem that 
arises in the scholastic’s iuris naturalis scientia when it tries to logically deduce the positive law from 
them. In fact, positive law (or any other content) could not at all be obtained by deduction from those 
principles, but only by determination of the legislator’s will once considered the different socio-
political circumstances (per modum particularis determinationis). Thus giving place to the plurality 
and contingency of positive law (diversitas legis positivae) as well as to its eventual deviation from 
morality (corruptio legis). Cf. Th. Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 95, art. 2, a. 4. The internal 
contradiction that this introduces, as universality and immutability of natural law principles is put into 
question, tries to be solved in an ad hoc manner by resorting to the above mentioned distinction 
between primary principles (unchangeable) and secondary principles (variable or historical, apud nos). 
See e.g. Leyden 1985: 72. This distinction remains in force in the background of practically all the 
contemporary interpretations of the Aristotelian texts (even those that have criticized the traditional 
iusnaturalist dichotomy in the light of the political nature of both natural and legal justice: see e.g. 
Burns: 1998: 154ff.). 
54 Aristotle is himself rather critic as to any utopian ideal of regime hardly able to come to existence 
(see Pol., IV, 11, 1295a25ff.). 
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might be the best one.55 So, relativism is discarded by the critical distinction between correct 
and deviated constitutions56. Practical philosophy is committed to the rational, normative 
enterprise of constructing universal models under a legislative-policy perspective57. Natural 
justice is then about the universal in the law, thus it is connected to the actual practice of legal 
justice institutions given in their particular political and moral context. The Aristotelian 
definition contains, in a nutshell, the basic axioms of a true philosophy of law —one quite 
different from both iusnaturalist metaphysics and formalist positivism. 
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